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Fairness as Appropriateness: Some Reflections on Procedural Fairness in WTO Law 
 
By Chios Carmody1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The subject of fairness is a perennial one in human and international affairs, and yet for all its pervasiveness, it 
is surprisingly hard to define.2 A definition would be helpful, if only to assist in illuminating the oft-mentioned 
distinction between procedural and substantive fairness.3 Examining the law with respect to at least one of 
these types of fairness – here the procedural kind – may assist in arriving at a stable conception of fairness with 
broader, more universal applications. 
 
In this contribution I examine aspects of procedural fairness in the law of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Generally speaking, WTO law is not a body of law that places direct emphasis on fairness. Instead, its 
most immediate concern is the “equality of competitive conditions”.4 That concern is tied to the law’s general 
orientation as an order of obligations. Member countries are obliged to treat all other member countries the 
same, a reflection of the general principle of equality in international law. Nevertheless, there have been a 
number of references to fairness and procedural fairness in WTO law and its dispute settlement system. Taken 
together, these can help to provide some idea of what a substantive conception of fairness involves. 
 
I will suggest here that, at a minimum, fairness can be understood as ‘appropriateness’, or what is fitting or 
proper in specific circumstances. We should understand the preoccupation with fairness - and especially 
procedural fairness - as a matter of the claims of one specific individual or interest versus another. Fairness is 
something that humans are chiefly concerned with as an attribute of their continuing relationships. Instinct tells 
us that it would make a poor rule for behaviour as a whole. The rational for this assertion is the plain fact that 
the law does not demand fairness in every instance. More often it demands equality – as WTO law amply 
demonstrates. I draw on examples from three different areas in WTO law: third party rights, the burden of 
proof, and the handling of evidence, to illustrate my point. In each WTO law appears to have developed its 
own conception of what is ‘appropriate’, or fair.  
 
Still, the subjectivity of each of these examples, and the particularity of the WTO legal system more generally, 
makes the derivation of an overarching definition of fairness problematic. Procedural fairness in WTO law 
must be understood as an artefact of a specific legal system. It is a system that focuses on “dispute settlement” 
as opposed to litigation, thereby subordinating concerns about procedural fairness to the collective goals of the 
law, and whose chief aim is “settlement”, that is, outcomes which may or may not be arrived at entirely fairly 
or appropriately. Moreover, behind the façade of WTO law lies a residual realm of negotiation and agreement-
making in which power politics remain a factor. Thus, conclusions reached about procedural fairness in WTO 
law here must be appreciated in light of the general character of the system from which they emanate. 
 
This contribution is divided into four parts. Following this introduction, Part II is devoted to providing some 
                                                        
1 Associate Professor & Canadian National Director, Canada-United States Law Institute, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, 
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7. email: ccarmody@uwo.ca. I would like to thank the editors of this volume, Armin Savarian and Filippo 
Fontanelli, for their invitation to present a version of this contribution at the Workshop on Procedural Fairness in International Courts and 
Tribunals, University of Surrey, Sept. 19-20, 2014, and for their comments on early drafts. Any errors are wholly my own. 
2 “Fair … [f]ree from bias, fraud or injustice; equitable, legitimate.” J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary – Vol. V (2nd 
ed.) 671 (1989). Legal dictionaries offer a slightly different definitions. “Fair means … 1. impartial; just; equitable; disinterested; 2. Free from 
bias or prejudice …”. Blacks Law Dictionary (9th ed.) 674 (Brian Garner, ed.); “Fair means … reasonable”, Daphne Dukelow, The Dictionary of 
Canadian Law (4th ed.) 474 (2011). 
3 Steven Suranovic has written, “The concept [of fairness] itself overlaps with many other normative principles such as justice, equity, law and 
even morality. As such, one cannot simply pick up a book or article and quickly discover what fairness means or how to distinguish between the 
various normative principles. And yet, at the same time, everyone seems to have an inherent sense of what fairness is.” Steven Suranovic, “A 
Positive Analysis of Fairness with Applications to International Trade” 23(3) The World Economy 283 (2000). See also Americo Bevigilia 
Zampetti, Fairness in the World Economy 26 (2006).  
4 Numerous WTO cases have emphasized the importance of the law’s maintenance of equality of competitive conditions. See for instance Japan 
– Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, p. 16 (4 Oct. 1996); Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, para. 120 (18 Jan. 1999); Chile – 
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87, 110/AB/R, para. 54 (13 Dec. 1999).  
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general observations about the nature of the WTO legal system and how specific concerns about procedural 
fairness arise within it. Part III is devoted to an examination of procedural fairness or appropriateness in 
relation to the third party rights, the burden of proof and the treatment of evidence in WTO law. Finally, Part 
IV offers some concluding reflections about a ‘stable conception’ of procedural fairness in WTO and other 
systems of international law. 
 
II. Procedural Fairness in WTO Law 
 
What does it mean to say that something is “fair”? In common English usage, for instance, what is “fair” is 
considered to be fitting or appropriate in the circumstances. We say, for example, that a particular transaction 
is “fair”, meaning that it is suitable for those concerned. This is not the same as saying that it is optimal. A fair 
transaction is simply unobjectionable. 
 
This set of preliminary observations provides some initial insight about the content of fairness. First, fairness is 
a rough measure of what is communally acceptable. It may not satisfy every interest fully, but it is enough to 
preserve the relationships involved. Second, the use of fairness suggests that it is something which applies in 
particular situations as opposed to general ones.5 Fairness is something that we are chiefly concerned with as 
an attribute of continuing relationships. 
 
These initial observations suggest that fairness is important as a procedural matter in WTO law chiefly in 
circumstances where the law is concerned with particular relationships as opposed to general ones. Specificity 
might be readily discernible in international criminal law, where the issue before a tribunal is the behaviour of 
a single defendant, or in international investment law, where the issue before an arbitrator is the behaviour of a 
state towards a particular investor, but it is more difficult to discern in WTO law where the implicit focus of 
the law is on maintaining the “equality of competitive conditions” among WTO members and where, 
consequently, specificity is more obscure.6 
   
To fully understand the nature of claims to procedural fairness in WTO law, therefore, we must understand the 
broader envelope, or environment, in which such claims are made. WTO dispute settlement is popularly 
thought of as a “trade court”. However, a number of key provisions in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), or WTO code of procedure, suggest that the system is designed to do something more 
than simply litigate individual members’ trade interests. WTO dispute settlement is styled “dispute settlement”, 
a term which suggests that while the system is tasked with the job of resolving individual “disputes”, its 
ultimate aim is “settlement”.7 
 
Disputes themselves originate between countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), a political 
organ of the WTO, and are heard by panels normally composed of representatives from three neutral 
countries.8 Panel functions are limited.9 The dispute settlement system is described as “a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system” serving “to preserve” rights and 
obligation of the membership and “to clarify” WTO law. (DSU Art. 3.2) Once a panel has finished its work, its 
recommendations and rulings are forwarded to the DSB which, in the normal course, adopts them as its own. 
                                                        
5 “The content of the duty to act fairly always depends on the circumstances of the particular case …”: T. R. S. Allan, Low, Liberty, and Justice 
198 (1994); “the demands of fairness depend on the circumstances”. Andrew Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes 145 (2008). 
6 Andrew Mitchell observes that “Several human rights treaties impose due process obligations on states … In addition, a number of bilateral 
trade or investment treaties contain standards regarding the treatment of aliens and these often include due process requirements.” Andrew 
Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes 151 (2011). It is noteworthy that Mitchell selects examples focused on the vindication of individual 
interests (human rights, investment protection etc.) where due process or fairness considerations might be expected to be pronounced. In WTO 
law the individual interest is diminished and fairness considerations therefore more muted.   
7 That interpretation is confirmed by several provisions in the DSU, especially Art. 3, which refers to the “the prompt settlement of situations” 
(DSU Art. 3.3), to “[r]ecommendations or rulings … [being] aimed at achieving a settlement” (DSU Art. 3.4) and to “[t]he aim of the dispute 
settlement mechanism [being] to secure a positive solution to a dispute.” (DSU Art. 3.7). 
8 Disputes begin within the general envelope of a “matter” raised in the DSB. A “matter” has been defined as “ … the specific measures at issue 
and the legal basis of the complaint (that is, the claims)”. EC – Bed Linen (Art. 21.5), WT/DS141/AB/RW, para. 78 (8 Apr. 2003) [emphasis in 
original]. 
9 The role of panels and the Appellate Body is said to be to “assist” the DSB in discharging its responsibilities with respect to “the settlement of 
disputes” (DSU Art. 1.1). 
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However, recommendations and rulings “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
covered agreements.” A number of panels have taken their cue from this wording to stress that their function is 
restricted to “assisting” the DSB in discharging its responsibilities.10 
 
The supplementary and assistive function of panels is reinforced by DSU provisions and interpretations that 
have the effect of muting antagonism between the parties. Procedural rules of dispute settlement have been 
described as being “designed to promote, not the development of litigation techniques, but the fair, prompt and 
effective resolution of trade disputes”.11 In addition, counterclaims are prohibited, something which tends to 
dilute assertions that the matter in question involves only the litigants alone.12 The system also lacks a 
mechanism for compulsory discovery, a feature which has obvious consequences for the fairness of rules 
related to handling of evidence.13 
 
Antagonism is further diluted by a number of DSU provisions and practices that appear to make WTO dispute 
settlement a multipolar exercise in achieving a resolution that is acceptable to all parties involved, including in 
some degree the WTO membership as a whole. As will be discussed, WTO law lacks a definition of standing, 
or ‘interest’, for the purposes of dispute settlement, meaning that in practice virtually any WTO member can 
participate in dispute resolution proceedings.14 Third parties – that is, parties formally outside the litigation – 
are accorded liberal rights of intervention and often have done so by expressing their views, offering 
interpretations, or making suggestions.15 Several dozen WTO disputes have featured multiple parties and third 
parties.16 
 
Procedural fairness considerations in WTO law arise in WTO review of national administrative proceedings, 
where foreign imports or importers can be the victim of national bias. This bias is often an issue in anti-
dumping proceedings, for instance, where a comparison must be made between the exported price and the 
normal value in the producer’s home market. Thus, for instance, Art. 2.4 of the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement (ADA) provides that in calculating margins of dumping “A fair comparison shall be made between 
the export price and the normal value.” The obligation is for national authorities to ensure that assessments of 
price are made that accurately reflect comparable conditions. In EC – Bed Linen a WTO panel had an 
opportunity to expand on comparability in light of the obligation of fairness as follows: 
  
… Read in light of the obligation in the Article 2.4 to make a fair comparison, the specific 
requirements to make comparisons at the same level of trade and at as nearly as possible at 
the same time, and the obligation to make due allowance for differences affecting price 
comparability, the use of the word comparable in Article 2.4.2 indicates to us that 
investigating authorities may insure comparability either by making necessary adjustments 
under Article 2.4, or by making comparisons for models which are, themselves, comparable.17 
 
The panel’s reference to a comparison “at the same level of trade and at as nearly as possible at the same time” 
                                                        
10 Mexico – Anti-Dumping Duties, WT/DS331/R, para. 7.2 (8 June 2007); U.S. - Lamb, WT/DS177/R, para. 7.280 (21 Dec. 2000); U.S. – 
Stainless Steel, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 155 (30 April 2008). 
11 U.S. – FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para. 166 (24 Feb. 2000) [emphasis added]. 
12 DSU Art. 3.10 provides ““[i]t is also understood that complaints and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not be linked.” 
Notwithstanding this, tit-for-tat litigation has been observed in WTO dispute settlement and is not uncommon. See the Brazil-Canada Aircraft 
cases (WT/DS46, WT/DS70), the EU-U.S. Large Aircraft (“Airbus/Boeing”) cases (WT/DS316, WT/DS353), EC – Commercial Vessels, 
WT/DS301/R, para. 7.127 (22 Apr. 2005). 
13 As noted in Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87, 110/R, para. 6.26 (15 June 1999). 
14 “…we believe that a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another Member under the DSU. The language of 
Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 and of Article 3.7 of the DSU suggests, furthermore, that a Member is expected to be largely self-regulating in 
deciding whether any such action would be ‘fruitful’.” EC – Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 135 (9 Sept. 1997). See also Turkey – Textiles, 
WT/DS34/R, para. 9.11 (31 May 1999). 
15 Third party participation is provided for in DSU Art. 10. Third parties cannot raise issues not raised by the parties themselves, but otherwise 
their participation has been “profound, vigourous and sustained.” Chi Carmody, “Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties under GATT” 18:4 Mich. 
J. Int’l L. 615 at 618 (Summer 1997). 
16 Cases involving large numbers of parties include EC – Bananas, WT/DS27 (24 third parties). WTO cases involving large numbers of third 
parties include Canada – Patent Protection, WT/DS114 (11 third parties), Australia – Plain Packaging, WT/DS434 (36 third parties). 
17 EC – Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.117 (30 Oct. 2000). 
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speaks to the circumstantial nature of a “fair” assessment. In essence, the treaty requires the comparison must 
be tailored to circumstances that are as close as reasonably possible to original conditions in the country of 
production. This could be accomplished either by one of the methods set out in ADA Art. 2.4 or some 
comparable method. Because the EC had not done so fully in that instance, it was found to have breached its 
obligation. 
 
Occasionally, the procedural obligation of fairness in WTO law is also something projected into national legal 
systems as something that must be furnished in the course of domestic administrative determinations, such as 
those involving anti-dumping proceedings. Thus in Brazil – Dessicated Coconut, for instance, the Appellate 
Body observed that: 
 
[b]ecause a countervailing duty is imposed only as a result of a sequence of acts, a line had to 
be drawn, and drawn sharply, to avoid uncertainty, unpredictability and unfairness concerning 
the rights of states and private parties under the domestic laws in force when the WTO 
Agreement came into effect.18 
 
More often, however, issues of fairness are raised in a variety of circumstances arising within WTO 
proceedings themselves. Like the duty of fairness in English and continental systems of administrative law, 
these involve circumstances where specific rights are in play and where the decision in question has some 
particular importance to an individual WTO country as opposed to another.19  
 
Within these proceedings the WTO Appellate Body has also referred to a requirement of due process. Due 
process, in turn, has been described as “fundamental to ensuring a fair and orderly conduct of dispute 
settlement proceedings”.20 In Canada – Continued Suspension due process was described as guaranteeing “that 
the proceedings are conducted with fairness and impartiality, and that one party is not unfairly disadvantaged 
with respect to other parties in a dispute.”21 Similarly, in Chile – Price Band System the Appellate Body 
observed that “[a] panel will fail in the duty to respect due process if it makes a finding on a matter that is not 
before it, because it will thereby fail to accord to a party a fair right of response.”22 In Canada – Continued 
Suspension the Appellate Body also observed that the allocation of the burden of proof in compliance 
proceedings was, among other considerations, a matter of “procedural fairness”.23 And again, in Chile – Price 
Band System an arbitrator assessing the reasonable period of time (RPT) for implementation by Chile noted 
that the RPT chosen “will fairly balance the legitimate needs of the implementing Member against those of the 
complaining Member.”24 Once more, the recurrent issue in claims of procedural fairness appears to involve 
                                                        
18 Brazil – Dessicated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p. 19 (21 Feb. 1997). 
19 It is useful to keep in mind that there is an analogous body of jurisprudence in English law and the law of other common law jurisdictions 
concerning the “duty of fairness” in administrative proceedings. This body can help to inform and supplement the idea of fairness as 
appropriateness put forward above given that what fundamentally is at issue as in many cases of fairness in international economic law is the 
relationship between government and the individual. In the domestic context courts have held that administrative tribunals and bodies owe a duty 
to be fair – usually conceived of as a duty to take into account the specific circumstances of the applicant – whenever the applicant’s rights are 
specially affected. The duty can be thought of as an individualization of the procedure to the applicant, or in other words, an obligation of 
“appropriateness”. The Supreme Court of Canada observed in Baker v. Canada that: 
 
[t]he values underlying the duty of procedural fairness relate to the principle that the individual or individuals affected 
should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly, and have decisions affecting their rights, interests, or 
privileges made using a fair, impartial, and open process, appropriate to the statutory, institutional, and social context of the 
decision.  
 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, para. 28. The passage from Baker speaks of a desire to tailor procedures and outcomes to the specific rights in question, 
thereby affirming the relationship between the state and the claimant. It also speaks to the point that law, which is largely instrumental, is best 
equipped to achieving procedural as opposed to substantive fairness. The same point has been made by other commentators who have referred to 
similar fairness principles developed in the context of European and EU administrative law. See for instance Stephan W. Schill, “Fair and 
Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law”, IILJ Working Paper 2006/6. 
20 Thailand – H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 88 (12 Mar. 2001) [emphasis added]. 
21 Canada – Continued Suspension, WT/DS321/AB/R, para. 433 (16 Oct. 2008) [emphasis added]. 
22 Chile – Price Band System, WT/DS207/AB/R, para. 176 (23 Sept. 2002) [emphasis added]. 
23 Canada – Continued Suspension, WT/DS321/AB/R, para. 361 (16 Oct. 2008) [emphasis added]. 
24 Chile – Price Band System (21.3), WT/DS207/13, para. 37 (17 Mar. 2003) [emphasis added]. 
5 
 
relationships among members and between tribunals and litigating parties.25 
 
What is noteworthy in these instances is the particular role of fairness. In both Canada – Continued 
Suspension and Chile – Price Band System the concept of fairness appeared to play a gap-filling function, 
serving as a “basket of meaning” in circumstances where the WTO Agreement itself is silent. On these 
occasions the Appellate Body appeared to borrow the concept from general principles of law, noting for 
instance in Canada – Continued Suspension that “the protection of due process is an essential feature of a 
rules-based system of adjudication, such as that established under the DSU.”26 The reference to “a rules-based 
system of adjudication” suggests that the exact source of due process obligation imposed by fairness lies 
simply in the impartial, adjudicative nature of WTO dispute settlement.  
 
Elsewhere, however, fairness has been linked more directly to the distinctive multipolar character of the 
system. Thus, in Mexico – Corn Syrup the Appellate Body examined a claim by Mexico that the panel had 
failed to set out a “basic rationale” for its decision, contrary to DSU Art. 12.7. The Appellate Body dismissed 
the claim but nevertheless observed in passing that the obligation to provide a basic rationale “reflects and 
conforms with the principles of fundamental fairness and due process”.27 It added that providing such an 
explanation “assists [a defending] Member to understand the nature of its [WTO] obligations” and promotes 
the aims of “security and predictability in the multilateral trading system and of clarifying the existing 
provisions of the covered agreements, because the requirement to provide “basic” reasons contributes to other 
WTO Members' understanding of the nature and scope of [their WTO] rights and obligations.”28 This example, 
like others, suggests WTO dispute settlement will employ several sources to elaborate on the idea of 
procedural fairness, sources that are ‘appropriate’ to the circumstances. 
 
III. Procedural Fairness in Action: Third Parties, the Burden of Proof and the Handling of Evidence 
 
With the above observations about the nature of WTO law, dispute settlement and procedural fairness in mind, 
I proceed to examine the exercise of third party rights, the burden of proof (and its reversal), and the handling 
of evidence, as specific examples of procedural fairness. In each area it is important to recall that when we are 
asking are the particular procedures fair, we are asking are the procedures appropriate? In other words, are they 
fitting or right in the circumstances? 
 
A useful subject to begin an examination of procedural fairness in WTO law with is the status of third parties 
in WTO dispute settlement. The traditional rule in international law is that a treaty creates no rights or 
obligations for third parties, a rule now formalized in Art. 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.29 The rule has been interpreted to preclude participation by third parties in many international 
proceedings, notably those of the International Court of Justice, because “the concept of opposability reduces 
the issue [in dispute] to one of bilateral application as between the immediate parties.”30  
 
This logic is questionable in a treaty like the WTO Agreement whose “central” and “essential” feature is a 
Most Favoured Nation clause, a clause that multilateralizes all benefits to the WTO membership.31 Thus, in 
WTO law a more permissive approach is contemplated. DSU Art. 10.1 provides: 
 
The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members under a covered 
                                                        
25 Canada – Continued Suspension, WT/DS321/AB/R, Annex IV, para. 6 (16 Oct. 2008) 
26 Canada – Continued Suspension, WT/DS321/AB/R, para. 433 (16 Oct. 2008).  
27 Mexico – Corn Syrup (21.5), WT/DS132/AB/RW, para. 107 (22 Oct. 2001) [emphasis added]. 
28 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
29 Art. 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) provides “A treaty does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third State without its consent.” 
30 See Christine Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law 2 (1994). For a discussion of third party intervention in the International Court of 
Justice see John Gaffney, “Due Process in the World Trade Organization” 14:4 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1173 at 1298 (1999). More recently some 
commentators have detected a slight relaxation in the ICJ’s traditionally restrictive interpretation of requests to intervene under ICJ Statute Arts. 
62-63. See Paolo Palchetti, “Opening the International Court of Justice to Third States”, 6 Max Planck U.N.Y.B. 139 (2002).  
31 US — Section 211 Appropriations Act, WT/DS176/AB/R, para. 297 (2 Jan. 2002). 
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agreement at issue in the dispute shall be fully taken into account during the panel process.32   
 
DSU Art. 10.2 provides “Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel … shall have an 
opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel.” Commenting on these 
rules the panel in Australia – Apples noted that “not only have third parties the right to make submissions in a 
dispute, but panels have the legal obligation to consider them.”33  
 
WTO members have activated their third party rights on many occasions, making submissions that are 
profound, vigorous and sustained. The ease of intervention speaks to the ‘multipolarity’ of many WTO 
disputes and the way that the definition of WTO law is part of shaping a broader common endeavour founded 
on interdependence. When something is conceived of as belonging to all, then all should have an interest in its 
definition. In this sense, liberal rights of participation appear appropriate in the circumstances, or ‘fair’. 
 
At the same time, third party rights in WTO law are not limitless. The need occasionally arises to restrict 
participation in order to get deals done. Thus, DSU Art. 4.11 provides that where a WTO member that is not a 
principal party believes it has a substantial interest at the preliminary consultation stage, it “shall be joined in 
the consultations, provided that the Member to which the request for consultations was addressed agrees that 
the claim of substantial interest is well-founded.” Skirmishing has occasionally occurred when third countries 
have been excluded at this phase, or later, in the case of arbitration, specified under DSU Art. 25, where the 
principal parties have exclusionary rights due to the law’s reassertion of a more evidently ‘bilateral’ nature.34 
This too might be appear to be procedurally “fair” in light of the acknowledged need to settle matters and 
restore communal peace. From another viewpoint, however, DSU Arts. 4.11 and 25 could be regarded as 
procedurally unfair in the sense that they restrict the generally liberal right of participation. The law’s 
vacillation is illustrative of the highly subjective nature of fairness, which is regarded differently by different 
actors in a legal system.35 
 
A second area where fairness concerns are evident in WTO law is with respect to the burden of proof in WTO 
proceedings, and in selected instances, its reversal. The ordinary rule on the burden of proof was outlined by 
the Appellate Body in U.S. – Shirts and Blouses, where it held that “a generally accepted canon of evidence in 
civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, [is] that the burden of proof rests upon the party, 
whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence”.36 At the same 
time, in U.S. – Clove Cigarettes the Appellate Body observed that “the burden of proof in respect of a 
particular provision in the [WTO Agreement] cannot be understood in isolation from the overarching logic of 
that provision, and the function it is designed to serve.”37 Thus, in a number of WTO proceedings panels and 
the Appellate Body have modified the ordinary rule to take account of the difficulty of either providing 
evidence or proving a negative. 
 
As mentioned, WTO dispute settlement has limited means of fact-finding. Parties are frequently exhorted to 
cooperate in the production of evidence - not always successfully. Adverse inferences can be drawn against a 
                                                        
32 Emphasis added. 
33 Australia – Apples, WT/DS367/R, para. 7.76 (9 Aug. 2010) [emphasis added]. See also U.S. – Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 101 (12 Oct. 
1998). For instances where panels have actively considered third party submissions, in some cases even preferring them to submissions by the 
parties see EC – Bed Linen, WT/DS141/AB/R para. 142-144 (1 Mar. 2001), U.S. – Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.443 (8 Sept. 2004), U.S. – 
Softwood Lumber, WT/DS264/AB/RW, paras. 98, 112 (15 Aug. 2006); U.S. – Aircraft, WT/DS353/R, para. 7.767 (31 Mar. 2011). 
34 DSU Art. 25.3 states, “Other Members may become party to an arbitration proceeding only upon the agreement of the parties which have 
agreed to have recourse to arbitration.” In retaliation proceedings pursuant to U.S. – Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R (4 Apr. 2012), for instance, 
the EU challenged a deal reached as a result of arbitration between the U.S. and Indonesia in that case. See “Clove Cigarettes: EU Challenges 
Indonesia at WTO over Compliance, Arbitration Proceedings” 18:22 BRIDGES (19 June 2014). Third party status has also been denied in a 
number of other arbitrations under DSU Art. 22.6: see EC – Bananas (Art. 22.6), WT/DS27/ARB, para. 2.8 (9 April 1999) (third party rights not 
granted to Ecuador); Brazil – Aircraft (22.6), WT/DS46/ARB, paras 2.4-2.6 (28 Aug. 2000) (third party rights not granted to Australia); US – 
Gambling Services (Art. 22.6), WT/DS285/ARB, paras 2.30-2.31 (21 Dec. 2007) (third party rights not granted to the EC).  
35 “… opposing parties may not share the same perceptions of fairness and due process.” John Gaffney, “Due Process in the World Trade 
Organization” 14:4 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1173 at 1193 (1999). 
36 U.S. – Shirts and Blouses, WT/DS33/AB/R, p. 14 (25 April 1997). 
37 U.S. – Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, para. 286 (4 April 2012) [emphasis in original]. 
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non-cooperative party.38 Similarly, in certain situations involving the invocation of an exception or the 
reasonable availability of alternative measures, WTO decision-makers have effectively reversed the burden of 
proof. These modifications may be understood as “appropriate”, hence fair, in a system where the body of law 
is composed largely of negative obligations, that is, obligations about what member countries must not do.39 
Situations can arise where the law’s attention focuses on what members should have done to fulfil their WTO 
commitments. Without a reasonable alternative, it would be impossible to say. At the same time, WTO panels 
and the Appellate Body cannot be tasked with the job of constructing a viable hypothetical. Member countries 
must also enjoy some latitude in the legislation they enact.    
 
As a result, in several instances the burden of proof has been reversed to require claimants to demonstrate how 
an alternative proposed by the claimant is more appropriate, or fair. In U.S. – Tuna II (Mexico), for instance, 
the measure at issue involved the WTO consistency of certain U.S. labelling requirements for tuna caught by 
Mexican fleets. The Appellate Body noted that the burden of proof required Mexico, as complainant, to make a 
prima facie case under Art. 2.1 of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) that the challenged 
measure created an “unnecessary obstacle” to international trade. The Appellate Body also held, however, that 
as part of making its prima facie case “a complainant may also seek to identify a possible alternative measure 
that is less trade restrictive, makes an equivalent contribution to the relevant objective, and is reasonably 
available.” This latter set of factors would apply to satisfy the requirements of TBT Art. 2.2, namely that 
“technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary.” Mexico proposed use of an 
alternative labelling standard in the U.S. market to satisfy this, an alternative that allowed for fishing by setting 
on dolphins, something the usual “dolphin safe” label prohibited. The Appellate Body ultimately decided that 
that the alternative proposed by Mexico would contribute to U.S. objectives “to a lesser degree than the 
measure at issue, because, overall, it would allow more tuna harvested in conditions that adversely affect 
dolphins to be labelled “dolphin-safe””.40 
 
The burden of proof is also shifted in compliance proceedings under DSU Art. 22.8, where emphasis is placed 
on the twin subjects of compliance and the need for settlement. As a last resort, WTO dispute settlement 
contemplates countermeasures by claimant countries. Countermeasures allow for temporary suspension of 
concessions and commitments under the WTO Agreement. The question has arisen as to who bears the burden 
of proof to prove that a member country has brought itself into compliance. In Canada – Continued 
Suspension, for instance, the Appellate Body noted that the burden “is a function of the following 
considerations … (1) what is the nature of the cause of action that is framed under DSU Article 22.8”, “(2) the 
practical question as to which party may be expected to be in a position to prove a particular issue” and “(3) 
consideration must be given to requirements of procedural fairness.”41 The Appellate Body said that it is 
“appropriate that the Member whose measure has brought about the suspension of concessions should make 
some showing that it has removed the measure found to be inconsistent by the DSB in the original 
proceedings, so that normality can be lawfully restored.”42 At the same time, it also went on to modify the 
usual rule on the burden of proof as follows: 
 
Much of the reluctance of the parties to secure a definitive determination in respect of Article 
22.8 is the apprehension that, upon initiation, a party will attract the full burden of proof. … In 
our view, the allocation of the burden of proof, in the context of Article 22.8, should not be 
determined simply on the basis of a mechanistic rule that the party who initiates the proceedings 
bears the burden of proof. As we have indicated, in case of a disagreement, both parties are 
under an obligation to secure a definitive multilateral determination as to whether the 
                                                        
38 “[A] panel is entitled to draw adverse inferences from a party’s refusal to provide information.” Argentina – Import Measures, 
WT/DS438/AB/R, para. 5.159 (15 Jan. 2015) citing U.S. – Wheat Gluten, WT/DS166/AB/R, para. 172-173 (22 Dec. 2000). 
39 Peter Gerhart has noted, for instance, that “All other WTO treaty obligations [apart from TRIPS] require states to refrain from taking action 
(“do not impose quotas”) or to refrain from taking action without meeting specified conditions (“do not ban foods without scientific evidence that 
they are unhealthy”).” Peter Gerhart, “Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory – TRIPS as a Substantive Issue” 32 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 357 at 
358 (2000). On the vagueness of many WTO norms see also Mary Footer, An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the World Trade 
Organization 187-189, 192-193 (2006) (referring to WTO norms as either prescriptive, prohibitive, permissive, exceptive or programmatic). 
40 U.S. – Tuna II (Mexico), WT/DS381/AB/R, para. 330 (16 May 2012). 
41 Canada – Continued Suspension, WT/DS321/AB/R, para. 361 (16 Oct. 2008). 
42 Ibid., para. 362. 
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suspension of concessions must be terminated. The burden of proof does not attach to a party 
simply because such party discharges this obligation. To hold otherwise would create a 
disincentive to act in a manner which we consider to be obligatory and desirable.43 
 
These comments appear to reinforce the idea that settlement is a joint obligation of all parties to a WTO 
dispute, and in some sense, of the WTO membership as a whole. Again, the fairness, or “appropriateness”, of 
such rulings is evident. 
 
A third domain of procedural fairness concerns arises in the handling of evidence. As mentioned, WTO law 
only possesses rudimentary fact-finding ability. WTO dispute settlement possesses no mechanism for 
compulsory discovery and there is as yet no power to issues subpoenas or compel testimony. Indeed, because 
of the lack of a discovery process, a rule of collaboration exists that often requires an adversary to provide the 
tribunal with documents that are in its sole possession.44 The very limited nature of fact-finding reflects the 
fact that members themselves retain significant power in the system. As noted, the system is essentially 
cooperative and is designed to settle disputes in a manner that does not “add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.” 
 
Still, the acknowledged power of member states sits in delicate tension with the need to discharge the burden 
of proof through the production of evidence. In U.S. – Zeroing, for instance, the Appellate Body emphasized 
that “the nature and scope of the evidence that might be reasonably expected by an adjudicator in order to 
establish a fact or claim in a particular case will depend on a range of factors, including the type of evidence 
that is made available by a Member's regulating authority”.45 It added that “a panel may have a sufficient basis 
to reach an affirmative finding regarding a particular fact or claim on the basis of inferences that can be 
reasonably drawn from circumstantial rather than direct evidence.”46 The decision-maker’s power is backed up 
by the implicit threat of drawing an adverse inference against a non-producing party. Thus, in Canada – 
Aircraft the Appellate Body observed that WTO members are “under a duty and an obligation to ‘respond 
promptly and fully’ to requests made by panels for information” under DSU Article 13.1 and drew an adverse 
inference against Canada for its failure to provide information about certain transactions.47 The fairness or 
appropriateness of such an outcome is once again evident given the limits of the dispute settlement system.    
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This brief contribution has aimed to give some idea of the nature and role of procedural fairness in WTO law. 
It is difficult - and potentially hazardous - to discern one meaning from many mixed, and often singular, 
references to “procedural fairness” in general. Nevertheless, there are common threads that run through them, 
the most consistent being that procedural fairness is variable. It depends on the circumstances and demands 
appropriateness. 
 
‘Appropriateness’ is itself a vague standard. What insight can it provide about the nature of procedural 
fairness? As we have seen, procedural fairness is an intensely subjective concept. It will vary from case to 
case, and to some extent, from institution to institution, depending upon the nature of the particular 
‘community’ and the importance that given to affirming the relationship between entities. It may be that 
procedural fairness or what is fair is understood “to connote impartiality, even-handedness or lack of bias”, as 
mentioned in U.S. – Softwood Lumber48, but such usages will not always be consistent, and indeed, WTO law 
                                                        
43 Ibid., para. 359-60 [emphasis added]. 
44 Argentina – Textiles, WT/DS56/R, para. 6.40 (25 Nov. 1997). 
45 WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 357 (4 Feb. 2009). 
46 Ibid. 
47 WT/DS70/AB/R, para. 186-190 (14 April 1999). DSU Art. 13.1 provides that “A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by 
a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate.” More recently see also Argentina – Import Measures, 
WT/DS438/AB/R, para. 5.159 (15 Jan. 2015) 
48 WT/DS264/AB/RW, para. 138 (15 Aug. 2006). On that occasion the Appellate Body borrowed from dictionary definitions. The Appellate 
Body went on to observe in a related footnote that, “The relevant dictionary meaning of “fair” is “just, unbiased, equitable, impartial; legitimate, 
in accordance with the rules or standards”, and “offering an equal chance of success”” The reference was drawn from Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, (5th ed.), W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol.1, p. 915.”  
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has evidenced a wide range of proximate terms to denote what is being referred to here. We have a broad, 
general idea of what is being got at, but agreement on the details in every instance may be elusive. A keen 
appreciation of the variability of fairness’ designations needs to be kept in mind when analysis of procedural 
fairness is undertaken. 
 
A related observation is the fact that trying to shoehorn all procedural fairness references in WTO law into the 
idea of fairness as appropriateness previewed in this contribution is probably impossible. Loose terminology, 
generalism and vagueness all play a role in blurring the boundaries of what is considered ‘fair’. For every 
hypothesis put forward above concerning the role of procedural fairness and its function in reinforcing 
community, some contrary usage can probably be found. We have to proceed, therefore, on the assumption 
that the idea of fairness as appropriateness may explain a large number - possibly even the majority - of 
procedural fairness references, but it will not explain every use. That qualification needs to be kept in mind in 
the search for a definition of substantive fairness going forward.    
